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Market Forces and Workers’ Power Resources:  
A Sociological Account of Real Wage Growth in Advanced Capitalism 
 
Abstract 
Sociologists rarely study the determinants of real wage growth, even though it 
affects core sociological concerns such as social stratification and income 
inequality.  Using data from 14 countries over a 38-year period, this study assesses 
the multifaceted determinants of real wage growth in the manufacturing sectors of 
advanced capitalist societies.  On this topic, neoclassical economics suggests that 
wages should track labor productivity, but sociological theories of class conflict 
suggest that both firms and workers use “power resources” to shape distributional 
outcomes in their favor.  Drawing on these ideas and others, the author argues that 
real wage growth is loosely related to productivity growth, but strongly related to 
the power resources of workers.  This argument is tested with panel regression 
techniques.  The results provide strong support for a power resource theory of 
wage determination.  The study ends by considering possible reasons for the weak 
effect of labor productivity on real wages.  
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Market Forces and Workers’ Power Resources:  
A Sociological Account of Real Wage Growth in Advanced Capitalism 
  
INTRODUCTION  
 The trajectory of real wage growth plays a crucial role in the social 
stratification of advanced capitalist societies, but sociologists rarely study this 
important issue.  During the post-war era, the hourly wages of ordinary workers 
grew steadily in nearly all advanced capitalist countries, helping to raise wages, 
boost living standards, and create relatively egalitarian societies.  Yet, over recent 
decades, wage growth slowed in many countries even though productivity growth 
remained robust.  This combination of outcomes—sluggish wage growth coupled 
with solid productivity gains—can push economic inequality upward, because it 
redirects the benefits of economic progress away from ordinary workers and 
toward capital and elite workers.  Given the prominence of such distributional 
changes, Morris and Western (1999) urge sociologists not only to study inequality 
among workers—a mainstay of social stratification research—but also how 
markets themselves distribute earnings and income.  The latter topic is 
traditionally the purview of economics, but slowly sociologists are turning their 
attention to this issue as well (e.g. Kollmeyer, 2012; Korpi, 2002; Kristal, 2010, 
2013).     
 Given the wide-ranging importance of this phenomenon, and its theoretical 
implications for our understanding of social stratification and inequality, it is 
surprising that few sociologists study the determinants of real wage growth (cf. 
Sakamoto and Kim, 2014; Western and Healy, 1999).  To fill this gap in the 
literature, the present study analyzes trends in the real hourly wages of 
manufacturing workers in 14 advanced capitalist countries over the last four 
decades.  The study focuses on the manufacturing sector partly because most 
advanced capitalist countries keep detailed historical data for this sector but not 
 
 
for others, and also because manufacturing has been the focal point of much 
theorizing about capitalism and its development.  
 To gain insight into the multifaceted social forces shaping real wage growth, 
the present study weighs the actual experiences of 14 countries against theoretical 
expectations about wage determination derived from sociological and economic 
theory. The starting point is neoclassical economics, which holds that under 
competitive market conditions workers earn wages equivalent to their 
productivity levels.  This idea is a bedrock of modern economic thought and a 
mainstay of economic textbooks.  However, some economists and sociologists note 
that a host of recent factors—such as technological change and industrial 
restructuring—advantage the pecuniary interests of capital and elite workers, 
possibly allowing them to retain more of the benefits of productivity growth for 
themselves (in economics, see Acemoglu, 2003; Autor et al., 1998; in sociology, see 
Fernandez, 2001; Kristal, 2013). I extend this model of real wage growth by 
drawing on sociological theories of class conflict, in particular the idea that workers 
use various forms of collective action to advance their interests in distributional 
struggles with their employers and capital more generally (e.g. Korpi, 1983; 
Wright, 2000).  Importantly, to my knowledge, no study uses such a wide-ranging 
theoretical framework to articulate an account of how real wage trajectories evolve 
in advanced capitalism.  
 Combining these ideas and others, the present study departs from the 
neoclassical perspective.  In particular, I argue that productivity growth creates the 
possibility for real wage gains, because it forms the material basis upon which new 
wealth is created, but whether real wages rise accordingly depends on multiple 
social forces affecting the relative bargaining power of firms and workers.  In this 
regard, over recent decades, neoliberal economic policy, high unemployment and 
the offshoring of routine production jobs serve to heighten the bargaining power 
 
 
of domestic manufacturing firms.  If left unchecked, these social forces weaken the 
link between wages and productivity by allowing capital and elite workers to 
increase their remuneration relative to ordinary workers.  Indeed, this appears to 
be happening in the United States (see Figures 1 and 2).  Yet, in other advanced 
capitalist countries, workers successfully attenuate these downward forces on 
their real wages by wielding organizational power in labor markets and political 
power in government. To anticipate my main finding, I conclude that over recent 
decades real wage growth in the manufacturing sectors of advanced capitalist 
countries is loosely related to productivity growth, but strongly related to the 
power resources of workers.   
 
 
REAL WAGE GROWTH IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM 
 
 To contextualize the present study and introduce its dependent variable, 
Figures 1 and 2 show trends in the real hourly wage paid to manufacturing workers 
in 14 advanced capitalist countries since 1970.  As the figures show, there is 
considerable variation in the trajectories of real wage growth among these 
countries.  In this regard, the United States is particularly noteworthy.  While over 
this nearly 40-year period the real wage grew by about 1.0 to 1.5 per annum in 
most countries, it stagnated in the United States.  This occurred even though the US 
manufacturing sector enjoyed sound productivity growth.  The stagnation of real 
wage growth means that, after adjusting for price inflation, American 
manufacturing workers are essentially no better off today than 1970.   How can we 
explain the uneven trajectory of growth across these countries?  The study now 
turns to developing theoretical explanations for this question by drawing on ideas 
from sociology and economics. 




MARKET FORCES AND STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC CHANGE 
 Productivity Growth.  A basic tenet of neoclassical economics is that under 
competitive market conditions workers earn wages equivalent to their 
productivity levels.  As workers become more productive—due to improved 
workplace technologies, new organizational strategies, or better occupational 
skills—market competition should compel employers to pass along the benefits of 
rising productivity to their workers in form of higher wages.   
 This idea stems from marginal productivity theory, an account of the 
distribution of income developed by several economists around the turn of the 
20th century (e.g. Clark, 1902).  Here the main idea is that market competition 
ensures that each factor of production—labor, capital, land—receives an income 
equivalent to its marginal productivity.  For labor markets, this means that the real 
wage should equal the marginal product of labor (MPL), defined as the value of the 
output produced by the last worker hired.  This should occur because if the real 
wage falls below MPL, firms can profit by adding more workers and workers can 
benefit from finding better paying jobs.  Both actions help to restore equilibrium at 
the point where the real wage equals the MPL.   
An influential interpretation of marginal productivity theory is that the 
relative share of income going to each factor of production should be constant over 
time.  This was famously demonstrated  by Cobb and Douglas (1928), who analysed 
labor’s share of income in the US manufacturing sector from 1889 to 1922 and 
found that it was remarkably stable over this period, staying around 75 percent of 
the sector’s total income (see also Kandor, 1961).  They surmised that when 
markets are competitive and the elasticity of substitution between workers and 
equipment is constant, rising labor productivity will increase labor’s aggregate 
income, but not its relative share, even if the ratio of workers to equipment 
changes.  For the purposes of my study, this argument suggests that wage growth 
 
 
is essentially a function of productivity growth, albeit short-term shocks and 
cyclical changes in labor demand may cause temporary deviations from this 
equilibrium (Elgin and Kuzubas, 2013).  This “stylized fact” of economics paints a 
rosy picture of capitalism, because it implies that workers and firms equitably 
share the benefits of rising productivity growth. 
Recently, some neoclassical economists question the idea of constant factor 
shares, and by extension the notion that productivity growth drives real wage 
growth in a stable manner.  Here the main insight is that recent technological 
change may not be factor neutral, but instead advantage capital more than labor.  
For instance, Acemoglu (2003) argues that if technological advancements in the 
workplace bolster the efficiency of equipment rather than workers, and if capital 
and labor are not easily interchangeable, then the returns to capital can outpace 
the returns to labor (see parallel argument in sociology by Kristal, 2013).  For labor 
markets more specifically, Autor and his colleagues (1998) argue that the growing 
use of computers and high-technology in the workplace affects workers with 
different skill levels in dissimilar ways, with technology tending to displace less-
skilled workers altogether, while making highly skilled workers more productive 
(see parallel argument in sociology by Fernandez, 2001).    
Ultimately, the above-mentioned arguments suggest that the pay-off for 
productivity growth may not be constant, but instead varies by the skill level of 
workers.  For my study, an obvious limitation of this explanation is that the 
trajectory of real wage growth varies considerably across my sample of 14 
countries, even though these countries are experiencing similar types of 
technological change.  Hence, if technological change alone cannot explain the 
unequal slowdown in real wage growth across my sample, what can?  Here I turn 
to the idea of market power.   
 
 
Starting in the 1930s, heterodox economists began questioning the notion 
that real wages always track productivity growth.  Famously, Robinson (1933) 
developed the concept of “monopsony” as an ideal type of “imperfect competition,” 
arguing that in some circumstances firms wield sufficient market power to set 
wages below MPL.  For labor markets, monopsony arises when dominant firms face 
limited competition for available workers, enabling them to set wages below the 
MPL.  Hence, whereas monopolists exploit consumers by inflating consumer prices, 
monopsonists exploit workers by suppressing wages (see parallel argument in 
sociology by Sørensen, 2000).  Although Robinson envisioned several 
circumstances under which monopsony might arise, including a “’gentlemen’s 
agreements not to spoil the market by biding up wages” (p. 293), mainstream 
economics treat it as a rare phenomenon, one that mainly occurs in geographically 
isolated communities with only one major employer (e.g. rural mining towns).  But 
I suggest it could arise from other circumstances, including attempts by 
policymakers to deregulate labor markets and relax anti-trust laws that previously 
prohibited the growing concentration of capital, which is found in many countries 
today (Foster et al., 2011).  Such neoliberal policy stances are pronounced in the 
United States, but evident in other advanced capitalist countries as well (Prasad, 
2006).   
Recently, Erickson and Mitchell (2007) argue that the US labor market 
resembles a textbook case of monopsony.  In supporting this claim, they point to 
the simultaneous occurrence of labor shortages, wage stagnation, and falling labor 
market participation in the 1990s.  This combination of outcomes is indicative of 
monopsony, because under competitive market conditions, labor shortages should 
force wages upward as firms compete to attract non-working persons back into the 
workforce.  However, in a monopsonistic labor market, dominant firms can hold 
wages in check, preventing them from rising to “clear” the labor shortage.   
 
 
 If firms do enjoy market power in terms of setting wages, how would this 
affect the productivity-wage relationship?  According to Vercherand (2014: 96-7), 
when consumer markets are competitive but labor markets are not, firms 
maximize profits by retaining the benefits of rising productivity for themselves (in 
the form of higher profits) rather than passing them along to their workers (in the 
form of higher wages).  To the degree that this occurs, the link between wages and 
productivity weakens—or perhaps breaks altogether.    
 There is little sociological research on wage determination, but what exists 
finds little support for the neoclassical depiction of the wage-productivity 
relationship.  In the most comprehensive study to date, Western and Healy (1999) 
examine real wage growth in the manufacturing sectors of 18 OECD countries from 
1966 to 1992 and find that the wage-productivity link weakened markedly in the 
late 1970s.  This finding, they believe, reflects a systematic shift in labor market 
performance—moving from a “golden age” in which full employment, productivity 
growth and strong labor market institutions facilitated rising real wages, to a “slow 
growth regime” in which changing market forces and weaker labor market 
institutions contribute to slower wage growth. They conclude that “the oil crisis [of 
the 1970s] initiated a novel type of recession that set all the advanced capitalist 
labour markets on a new path of development” (p. 244).1  Similarly, Sakamoto and 
Kim (2014) examine data from 65 industries within the US manufacturing sector 
from 1971 to 2001 and find that the earnings pay-off for labor productivity was 
higher in 1971-1981 than 1991-2001.  Indeed, these arguments are consistent with 
data gathered for the present study (see Table 1).     
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
When combined with the monopsony argument from economics, the 
empirical findings from sociological research suggest that labor markets may be 
 
 
insufficiently competitive to compel firms to equate pay with productivity.   Indeed, 
as Figure 1 and 2 show, this appears to be happening in the United States, and to a 
lesser degree in other countries as well.  In sum, drawing on the aforementioned 
literature, I expect productivity growth to be positively linked to real wage growth, 
but not to the extent suggested by the neoclassical model of labor markets.  I also 
expect the wage-productivity relationship to weaken from the early 1980s onward, 
as the rise of neoliberalism bestows greater market power upon dominant firms.  
 Unemployment. The social sciences contain competing views on the 
relationship between unemployment and wages.  Starting with Marx (1867/1967: 
Chapter 25), critical scholars see high unemployment as a major impediment to 
wage growth (Kalecki, 1943; Schor, 1985).  On this subject, Marx described the 
unemployed as an “industrial reserve army,” used by capital to undercut the wage 
demands of workers.  In this way, Marx saw the jobless as an ever-present drag on 
the bargaining power of the working class, helping employers to discipline 
workers, check wage growth and maintain profitability.  Following this line of 
reasoning, Kalecki (1943) argued that left-labor parties should push for full 
employment, because it not only helps the jobless find work, but more importantly 
shifts the entire balance of class power toward workers (see also Korpi, 2002).   
In stark contrast, the neoclassical model argues that unemployment arises 
from overly generous wages (Friedman, 1968; Hall, 1979).  Here the idea is that 
competitive market forces yield a “natural rate of unemployment,” emanating from 
the inherent dynamism of labor markets and reflecting the equilibrium wage.  If the 
real wage exceeds the equilibrium rate—because it was bid up by strong trade 
unions and labor-friendly government—the supply of labor will outstrip its 
demand, making jobs relatively scarce.  More recently, however, Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1996) question this view.  Using data from local labor markets in 16 
 
 
countries, they find that the wage-unemployment relationship forms a downward-
sloping “wage curve,” suggesting that high unemployment reduces wages.  Their 
theoretical explanation is equivocal, but they do not dismiss Marx’s account of the 
“industrial reserve army.” 
Hence, following Marx’s theoretical explanation and Blanchflower and 
Oswald’s empirical findings, I expect unemployment to slow wage growth by 
altering the dynamics of wage bargaining.  In particular, when unemployment 
increases (making available workers more abundant), firms can retain workers 
and attract new ones without raising wages.  However, when unemployment falls 
(making available workers scarce), wage hikes become increasingly necessary to 
attract and retain workers.  In sum, given that most advanced capitalist countries 
experienced rising unemployment during the 1980s and 1990s—a stark break 
from the full employment of the post-war era—I expect that widespread 
joblessness slowed real wage growth over this period. 
 New International Division of Labor.   Globalization spatially reorganized 
manufacturing processes worldwide.  In an earlier account of this phenomenon, 
Fröbel and his colleagues (1980) explain that for most of the modern era North-
South trade manifest as firms in advanced capitalist countries importing raw 
materials from less developed countries (LDCs), manufacturing these materials 
into finished goods, and then exporting the surplus production around the world.  
By the 1970s, however, technological developments and trade liberalization 
enabled these firms to outsource many of their routine production jobs to 
contractors in LDCs.  Ultimately, the growing popularity of this production strategy 
created a “new international division of labor,” in which most of the world’s low-
valued added manufacturing activities now occurs in LDCs.  We know that this 
spatial reallocation of labor contributed to the deindustrialization of advanced 
 
 
capitalist countries (Kollmeyer, 2009), but how did it affect wages in the 
manufacturing sectors of these countries?   
 As described by Wood (1994), North-South trade should put downward 
pressure on the wages of less-skilled workers in advanced capitalist countries.  
This should occur, he argues, because North-South trade essentially links labor 
markets in advanced capitalist countries with those in LDCs, especially for the 
types of labor used in routine manufacturing.  As manufacturing jobs move 
overseas, demand for less-skilled workers in advanced capitalist countries falls, 
creating downward pressure on their wages.   
 Despite the soundness of Wood’s economic reasoning, empirical studies of 
the US labor market in the 1990s and 2000s find limited support for his argument 
(see Krugman, 2008).  Common explanations for these counter-intuitive findings 
are that the volume of trade with LDCs is simply too small (relative to size of US 
economy) to engender meaningful effects, or that technological change rather than 
trade is the primary cause of slowing wage growth.  By contrast, cross-national 
studies of advanced capitalist countries conclude that trade with LDCs puts upward 
pressure on income inequality, as Wood’s theory predicts (Kollmeyer, 2015), but 
whether it slows real wage growth in the manufacturing sectors is unclear.     
 Complementing Wood’s argument, I propose another mechanism by which 
trade globalization may affect the real wages of domestic manufacturing workers.  
Clearly, the new international division of labor contributes to deindustrialization, 
which in turn reduces demand for labor in this sector.  However, it may also 
qualitatively reshape domestic manufacturing in ways that put upward pressure 
on wages.  Here the crucial point is that manufacturing firms are not outsourcing a 
broad cross-section of jobs, but rather routine production jobs in particular 
(Kollmeyer, 2009:1652; Whitford, 2005).  In other words, the outsourced jobs 
disproportionally entail labor-intensive and low value-added activities, whereas 
 
 
the retained jobs disproportionally entail capital-intensive and high-value added 
activities.  In this way, the new international division of labor facilitates an 
industrial upgrading of domestic manufacturing, making the sector not only 
smaller, but also more focused on high value-added activities.   It is unclear which 
of these countervailing forces will affect real wages the most—the falling demand 
for labor (as Wood suggests) or the upgrading to higher value-added activities (as 
I suggest).   My expectation is that these two forces counterbalance one another, 
creating a situation in which the new international division of labor exerts little 
overall effect on the real wages of manufacturing workers in advanced capitalist 
countries.  
  
NON-MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND WORKERS’ POWER RESOURCES  
 Undoubtedly market forces are important determinants of real wage 
growth, but social forces lying beyond the strict sphere of the market are important 
as well.  In this regard, sociologists emphasize that employment relations often 
generate class conflict, and that firms and workers use different types of “power 
resources” to advance their interests within these conflicts (e.g. Esping-Anderson, 
1985; Jacobs, 1988; Korpi, 1983, 2006; Western, 1998; see similar argument in 
economics by Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).  As articulated by Korpi (1983, 2006), 
dominant firms are structurally advantaged in labor market relations by their strict 
control over enormous economic assets (see also Jacobs, 1988).  This constitutes 
their key power resource, because it gives them considerable bargaining power 
over lone workers when setting wages and working conditions.  Yet workers can 
respond by creating and wielding their own power resources, but this entails some 
sort of collective action. 
 Trade Unions. Trade unions are notable in this regard.  The lone worker 
must accept the prevailing wage, even if depressed by the bargaining power of 
 
 
dominant firms.  But large groups of workers, acting in a coordinated fashion, 
generate their own power, which can be used to improve wages and working 
conditions.  The positive effect of trade unions for workers is well documented.  
Studies suggest that unions help workers to earn higher wages (Rosenfeld, 2014: 
68 -73) and to reduce wage inequality among unionized and nonunionized workers 
alike (Rosenfeld, 2014: 74-79).  Other studies show that unions boost labor’s share 
of income (Kristal, 2010, 2013) and reduce overall levels of income inequality 
(Kollmeyer, 2014).    
 However, in order to generate these beneficial effects for workers, trade 
unions must be sufficiently strong.  Here two points are noteworthy.  First, due to 
divergent trends over recent decades, participation in trade unions varies greatly 
across advanced capitalist countries.  For instance, by the late 2000s, trade union 
density was almost six times higher in Denmark and Sweden than in the United 
States and France (Visser, 2011).  These differences mean that workers in different 
advanced capitalist countries possess dissimilar levels of organizational power.   
 Second, strong trade unions may not always result in higher wages.  On this 
topic, Wright (2000) puts forward the theoretical claim that trade unions reduce 
profits and increase wages, but only at low to moderate levels of strength.  Once 
workers’ organizational power becomes strong enough to induce robust labor-
capital collaboration, powerful trade unions may improve profits by facilitating 
cooperation between firms and workers.  Wage restraint is one conceivable 
outcome of such cooperation (pg. 980).  For instance, since rapid wage growth may 
jeopardise the profitability of employers, strong trade unions may accept slower 
wage growth in an effort to secure their long-term job prospects.  Based on this 
logic, I expect unionization’s effect on real wage growth to be curvilinear, with low 
levels unionization being associated with rising real wages, but high levels of 
unionization being associated with wage moderation.   
 
 
   Wage Bargaining Systems. The centralization of wage bargaining is another 
potential power resource for workers (Crouch, 1993; Streeck and Kenworthy, 
2005; Western, 1998).  In corporatist systems, such as those found in Sweden and 
Austria, decisions about wages and employment relations are made through 
tripartite negotiations at the national level, with the resulting decisions uniformly 
implemented by local employers and trade unions.  In decentralized systems, such 
as those in the United States and Canada, individual workers or local trade unions 
negotiate directly with their local employers, giving trade unions little influence 
over national wage policy.  Hence, corporatism should constitute a power resource 
for workers, because it enables them to organize and pursue their class interests 
across the breadth of the economy.   
 Yet how does corporatism affect wage growth?  Similar to Wright’s (2000) 
argument, some scholars contend that corporatism embeds trade unions in formal 
state power structures, thereby encouraging them to consider the wider socio-
economic implications of their actions (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Hedström, 
1986; Hicks and Kenworthy, 1998; Wallerstein, 1990).  Given that robust wage 
growth can undermine the competitiveness of a country’s economy or spur 
inflation and unemployment, trade unions operating within corporatist bargaining 
systems may view wage moderation as strategically beneficial to their long-term 
interests.  Conversely, trades unions operating in decentralized wage bargaining 
systems have less capacity to coordinate farsighted actions and to ensure that 
related costs and benefits are shared equally among relevant actors.  For this 
reason, strategic wage moderation is unlikely to occur in this institutional context.   
 Overall, my expectation is that corporatism leads to wage moderation, 
because it allows trade unions to consider the negative consequences of robust 
wage growth.   Yet this effect may be curvilinear.  Here Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
famously argue that intermediate levels of corporatism afford trade unions enough 
 
 
power to put upward pressure on real wages, but not enough coordinating capacity 
to implement wage moderation strategies.  Hence, they link wage moderation with 
low levels of corporatism (due to insufficient bargaining power) and with high 
levels of corporatism (due to the organizational capacity to consider the negative 
consequences of rapid wage growth). 
 Left-Labor Parties.  Left-labor parties are another important power 
resource for workers.  As described by Korpi and others, workers can pursue a 
“democratic class struggle” by joining and voting for political parties that champion 
their class interests (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Korpi, 1983).  When in government, 
left-labor parties typically pursue economic policies that benefit workers, including 
policies that may increase the real wage.  However, like trade union participation, 
the power of left-labor parties varies greatly across advanced capitalist countries.  
In this regard, the United States and Canada are notable for lacking genuine left-
labor parties, as political experts often regard the Democratic Party and Liberal 
Party as centrist not left-labor (see Castles and Mair, 1984).   
 However, it is questionable whether left-labor parties can still advance the 
interests of workers.  For some scholars, the rise of globalization and the 
maturation of the welfare state led to multi-partisan support for fiscal 
consolidation and neoliberal regulatory approaches, causing left-labor parties to 
moderate their social democratic aims (Pierson, 1996).  Despite such claims, my 
expectation is that left-labor governments still matter for basic distributional 
outcomes, especially ones such as whether real wages rise or stagnate. 
  
DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
Sample 
 To test my arguments about the determinants of real wage growth, I collect 
annual observations on 14 advanced capitalist countries from 1970 to 2007. The 
 
 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
Large amounts of missing data on labor productivity prevent the inclusion of other 
advanced capitalist countries, such Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland.  Combining the cross-sectional and temporal dimensions of the data 
yields a maximum of 532 observations per variable (t = 38 × n = 14), but missing 
data reduce the number of complete observations to 520.2   
 
Measurement 
 The study’s dependent variable is the real wage.  Data come from the 
OECD’s (2015a) Main Economic Indicators database.   The OECD collects and 
harmonizes national data on the average hourly wage paid to manufacturing 
workers. This data is only available for the manufacturing sector, which is the 
primary reason why my study focuses on manufacturing rather than the whole 
private sector. 3   The data come from nationally representative surveys of 
manufacturing firms and reflect not only regular wages, but also overtime pay, 
recurring cash bonuses, and employer contributions to private or government-
mandated social insurance schemes.  The OECD presents these wage series as 
indices (with the year 2007 = 100).  I then deflate the series with the OECD’s 
(2015b) Consumer Price Indices.  I experiment with a log transformation of this 
variable.  The substantive results are the same, but the regression output is 
cumbersome to interpret.  Hence, I kept this variable in its original index form.  Also 
note that Western and Healy (1999), the study most similar to mine, do not use a 
log transformation. 
 Three variables capture economic conditions thought to affect real wage 
growth.  The variable productivity growth gauges the growing efficiency of the 
manufacturing sector.  It uses the OECD’s (2010) “labor productivity index,” which 
 
 
measures total value-added per worker expressed in volumes of output.   Although 
hours worked is preferable to total employment as a measure of labor inputs, this 
variable significantly improves upon the measure used by Western and Healy 
(1999), since they used real GDP per person in the national workforce as a proxy 
for productivity in the manufacturing sector.  I benchmark this index against output 
levels prevailing in 2007, but since the index is measured in volumes rather than 
monetary amounts, there is no need to adjust for inflation.   
 The second economic variable is the OECD’s harmonized measure of 
unemployment (OECD 2015c).  Implementing standards set by the International 
Labour Organization, the OECD measures unemployment as the percentage of a 
country’s civilian workforce unable to find employment in a given year.  To be 
considered unemployed, individuals must be jobless but available for work and 
actively seeking it.  Following Blanchflower and Oswald (1995), I use the log of 
unemployment as the functional form.  This captures the curvilinear relationship 
suggested by their “wage-curve” hypothesis.  I experiment with other functional 
forms—i.e. inverse of unemployment and unemployment and its squared term.  
Each works but the logarithmic format performs best.   
 The final economic variable is imports from LDCs.  This variable captures 
the emergence and intensification of the “new international division of labor” and 
equals the annual value of imported manufactured goods from LDCs.  The resulting 
figures are expressed as percentages of GDP.  For the purpose of this variable, LDCs 
are defined as non-OECD countries, plus Mexico and Turkey, and manufactured 
goods are defined as categories five through eight of the international standard 
industrial classification scheme, revision two.  Trade data come from OECD 
(2012a) and GDP data come from the OECD (2012b).  
 Three variables measure workers’ power resources.  To capture workers’ 
organizational strength, trade union density equals the number of workers in trade 
 
 
unions expressed as a percentage of the national workforce.  A squared term is 
included to allow for the inverted U-shaped relationship depicted by Wright 
(2000).  Data come from Visser (2011). To capture the distributional effects of 
wage-setting institutions, corporatist wage bargaining measures the degree of 
concertation, centralization and coordination within wage-bargaining systems, 
with higher scores representing higher degrees of corporatism.  Data come from 
Jahn (2016), who creates his corporatism index from Visser’s data on trade 
unionism and wage bargaining institutions.  A squared term is also included to 
allow for non-linear effects.  To account for workers’ political strength, left-labor 
government measures the percentage of all cabinet posts held by social-democratic, 
labor or other left parties in given years.  Note the Democratic Party in the United 
States and the Liberal Party in Canada are coded as centrist not left-labor.  Data 
come from Armingeon and colleagues (2012).   
 
STATISTICAL ESTIMATION 
 My estimation strategies account for three overarching complications 
associated with panel data.  The first complication is that standard applications of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) assume that the sample’s observations are 
independent, but my panel data track individual countries over time.  While this 
allows me to model growth in real wages across different market and institutional 
contexts, it also introduces unmeasured heterogeneity into my model.  If this is not 
addressed and unmeasured heterogeneity is correlated with one or more of the 
independent variables, OLS will yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.  
To account for this complication, I use a two-way fixed effects (FE) estimating 
strategy (Halaby, 2004; Wooldridge, 2012: chapter 14).  This technique absorbs 
unmeasured country- and time-specific heterogeneity by introducing unique 
dummy variables for each country and year in my data set.   I also consider a 
 
 
random effects (RE) model, but a Hausman test suggests that this technique is 
inappropriate for my study.4  Note that FE models allow me to explain change in 
the real wage within countries, but not differences in levels across countries. 
 A second complication arises from the complex error structures generated 
by panel data (Wooldridge, 2012: chapter 12).  Given the long temporal dimension 
of my data, serial correlation could be a problem.  Additionally, the model’s errors 
may be contemporaneously correlated and heteroscedastic.  If some or all of these 
issues are present but not addressed, OLS regression will generate inefficient 
parameter estimates and biased standard errors (Halaby, 2004: 523-4).  To 
investigate whether my model is suspect in this manner, I conduct post estimation 
tests on my two-way FE model.  The null hypotheses are that the errors in this 
model are neither heteroscedastic, contemporaneously correlated, nor serially 
correlated.  Results suggest that these issues are present in my data.5   
 To deal with these complications, I estimate my models with a version of 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression.  Through a two-sequence 
transformation, FGLS rids the model of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
Specifically, I use the Prais-Winsten procedure, which is more efficient than other 
FGLS techniques because it retains the first observation in the time-series 
(Wooldridge 2012: 425).  Additionally, I adopt panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) to account for contemporaneously correlated errors.      
 A final complication arises from time trends within my data.  When using 
data with a temporal dimension (either time-series or panel data), one must be 
wary of “spurious regression” (DeBoef and Keele, 2008; Wooldridge, 2012: 
chapters 10, 11 and 18).  Spurious regression can occur when key variables trend 
over time rather than vary randomly.  This is the case for both my real wage and 
productivity variables, which as shown in Figure 1 drift upward in most countries.6  
Given shared time trends, my FE models may generate statistically significant 
 
 
results, even if there is no underlying causal relationships.  To guard against this 
outcome, researchers often introduce a time-trend variable to their models (i.e. 
trend = 1, 2, 3… n).  This variable absorbs statistical distortions related to trending 
data, thereby reducing the chance of spurious regression.  However, for my study, 
it is inappropriate to impose a single trend across my whole sample.  Hence, I 
capture country-specific time trends by creating unique interaction terms between 
the generic time-trend and each of the 14 country dummy variables.   
 In sum, my main modelling strategy uses all the aforementioned procedures 
(e.g. two-way FE regression with PCSE, country-specific time trends, and 
estimation by FGLS).  While this strategy addresses the primary complications 
associated with panel data, I nonetheless check the robustness of my findings and 
provide additional safeguards against spurious regression by re-estimating my 
parameters using first difference (FD) regression (Wooldridge, 2012: chapter 13; 
DeBoef and Keele, 2008).  This technique entails first differencing each variable—
e.g. (t2 – t1)—and then estimating the model as normal.  This mathematical 
transformation eliminates time trends within the data and accounts for 
unmeasured heterogeneity, making the use of country fixed effects unnecessary.  
However, I retain the 14 country-specific time trends, because even after first 
differencing slight trends can remain.  As with my FE models, I account for the 
complex error structure with FGLS and PCSE and use year dummy variables to 
account for unmeasured time-specific effects.   
 Finally, a few additional steps are taken to improve the accuracy of my 
model.  First, I test for problematic outliers with the BACON robust outlier 
detection algorithm (p = .05), but none are found. Second, I test for 
multicollinearity by examining variance inflation factors for each independent 
variable.  Only acceptable levels of multicollinearity are found7.  Third, for Model 4 
only, I use a dynamic specification in which a one-year lag of the real wage is 
 
 
introduced as a right-hand side regressor.  Dynamic processes often characterize 
phenomena of interest to social scientists, and comparative researchers commonly 
use such specifications in their statistical models.  Yet lagged dependent variables 
can create biases and complications (Keele and Kelly, 2006; Plümper et al., 2005).  
Hence, I use this specification sparingly, mainly to demonstrate that my general 
argument holds under a dynamic specification.  
 
RESULTS 
Fixed Effects Models 
 Using the data and methods described above, Table 2 presents FE 
regression models of change in the real hourly wage of manufacturing workers in 
14 advanced capitalist countries.  Model 1 begins by examining the effects of 
market conditions in isolation.  Recall that neoclassical theory views productivity 
growth as the main driver of real wage growth, but some sociological and economic 
theories question this view.  Consistent with the neoclassical view, results from 
Model 1 support the argument that rising productivity growth propels the real 
wage forward.  Additionally, consistent with Marx’s (1867/1967) account of the 
“industrial reserve army” and Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1995) account of the 
“wage curve,” results indicate that unemployment slows real wage growth.  This 
latter finding suggests that the rising unemployment experienced by many 
advanced capitalist countries in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to slower real 
wage growth for manufacturing workers in these countries.   Note that my FE 
models cannot directly adjudicate the neoclassical view of unemployment, because 
this view emphasizes levels rather than changes in the real wage. 




 Model 1 also considers the effects of the new international division of labor.  
Here the variable imports from LDCs captures the emergence and intensification 
of the new international division of labor and its associated effect on the real wages 
of manufacturing workers in advanced capitalist countries.  Consistent with 
Wood’s theoretical expectations about falling demand for less-skilled workers, the 
parameter estimate for this variable is statistically significant and negative, 
suggesting that trade with the LDCs slows real wage growth in manufacturing 
sectors of advanced capitalist countries. For my sample, imports of manufactured 
goods from LDCs rose, on average, from 0.8 percent of GDP in 1970 to 5.5 percent 
of GDP in 2007, suggesting that the accumulative effect of imports from LDCs on 
real wage growth is likely to be considerable.     
 Next, Model 2 presents a power resource model of real wage growth.  As 
anticipated by sociological accounts of class struggle under democratic capitalism, 
all the parameter estimates are statistically significant and exhibit expected signs.  
Specifically, the results show that trade union density and left-labor governments 
heighten real wage growth, but that corporatist wage bargaining moderates it.  
Furthermore, the squared term for trade union density is negative and statistically 
significant, providing some support for Wright’s claim that increases in workers’ 
organizational power can induce wage restraint along a curvilinear path.  Similarly, 
the squared term for corporatist wage bargaining is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting the moderating effect of corporatism is curvilinear.  In sum, 
Model 2 provides strong support for the argument that workers’ power resources 
are important determinants of real wage growth.   
 Model 3 combines market and power resource explanations for real wage 
growth into single model.  Interestingly, the results are remarkably similar to the 
earlier models, suggesting few confounding effects between the market and 
institutional factors examined in my study.  However, one notable change is that 
 
 
the effects of unemployment and left-labor government are both smaller in the full 
model.  This suggests that some of left-labor government’s positive effect on real 
wages results from its drive to lower unemployment, and that some of 
unemployment’s negative effect on real wages results from its positive link with 
pro-business governments.  Once these confounding influences are controlled for 
in the full model, the specific effects of unemployment and left-labor government 
become clearer. 
 Importantly, Model 3 suggests that trade union density is a major 
determinant of real wage growth.  This is especially true given that trends in trade 
union density vary considerably across my sample.  For example, trade union 
participation in Finland increased from 51 percent to 80 percent of the workforce 
between 1970 and 1996.  It then slowly ebbed back to 72 percent by 2007.  
Conversely, trade union participation in the United States steadily dwindled over 
the entire 38-year period, falling from 26 percent of the workforce in 1970 to only 
11 percent in 2007.  These diverse trends, coupled with the relatively large 
parameter estimate for trade union density shown in Model 3, suggest that 
variation in the organizational power of workers is an important factor in 
explaining why real wages in manufacturing are stagnate in some countries but not 
in others.   
 Next, Model 4 re-examines my full FE model, but this time using a dynamic 
specification.  This is accomplished by including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) 
as a right-hand side regressor.  For my study, a LDV captures the possibility that 
prior levels of the real wage affect present rates of change in the real wage.  Indeed, 
this appears to be the case, as the LDV is highly significant.  Interestingly, under a 
dynamic specification, the effect of market explanations for real wage growth 
decline substantially.  In particular, the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
productivity and unemployment parameter estimates are greatly reduced, but the 
 
 
parameter estimates for the workers’ power-resource variables change in less 
notable ways.  Regarding the latter, the biggest change is the enlargement of the 
negative effect of corporatism.  This is consistent with the theoretical argument 
that corporatism induces wage moderation when the prevailing real wage becomes 
large enough to threaten economic performance and employment stability.  In sum, 
the power resource explanations appear more robust to this dynamic specification 
than the market-forces explanations.    
 
First Difference Models 
  The empirical analysis now re-examines the determinants of real wage 
growth, but this time using FD regression. Recall that due to shared time trends in 
my data some of the statistically significant relationship shown in Table 2 may be 
spurious.  This could happen even though I guard against such outcomes with 
country-specific time trends.  I am particularly worried that the apparently strong 
link between productivity and the real wage is spurious, since both phenomena 
generally trend upward over the period in question (see Figure 1 and Note 6).  To 
examine this possibility, I re-estimate my models using the more conservative FD 
regression techniques described above.  The results are shown in Table 3.   
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
 After introducing this more strenuous control for spurious regression, the 
substantive conclusions change in pronounced ways.  Under the FD regression, the 
effect of productivity growth on real wages weakens notably, both in terms of its 
magnitude and statistical significance.  These revised results—pointing toward a 
weak relationship between productivity and real wages—are now consistent with 
critical accounts from heterodox economics and sociology.  Additionally, the 
parameter estimate for imports from LDCs is smaller and highly insignificant.  
Although this outcome is unanticipated by Wood’s account of trade globalization, 
 
 
it is consistent with my argument that  the new international division of labor has 
limited effect on real wages because it not only shrinks the manufacturing sectors 
in advanced capitalist countries, but also upgrades them to higher value-added 
activities.  From a methodological perspective, the difference between the FD and 
FE models suggests that shared time trends between productivity and real wages 
and between imports from LDCs and real wages account for some of the strong 
effects found in the earlier FE models.  By contrast, the variables representing 
workers’ power resource retain much of their explanatory power despite the 
introduction of the more conservative FD approach.  
  Finally, continuing with the FD regression, I examine the possibility of a 
temporal break in the distributional effects of productivity growth.  Recall that 
Western and Healy (1999) and Sakamoto and Kim (2014) find that the wage-
productivity link weakened sometime in the late 1970s.  If this occurred, then my 
models are misspecified because they fail to account for this structural shift.  To 
test this idea, I introduce a multiplicative interaction term between productivity 
growth and the neoliberal era (coded 1 for years 1980 onward).  This specification 
assumes that a clear and uniform break occurred across the breadth of my sample.  
Admittedly, this is a simplistic assumption, but a more realistic model (one trying 
to identify unique temporal breaks for each country) is difficult to undertake.  (See 
Western and Healy, 1999, for an explanation of how this might be done using 
Bayesian methods).  Nonetheless, if a general shift in the productivity-wage 
relationship did occur sometime around 1980, my re-specified model should 
provide some evidence of this outcome.    
Model 8 examines this more complex specification.  Starting with the 
variables from Model 7, it adds a neoliberal period indicator and the 
aforementioned interaction term.  Contrary to expectations derived from Western 
and Healy (1999) and Sakamoto and Kim (2014), results from this re-specified 
 
 
model provide only tentative evidence of a temporal break.  Although the main 
effect and the interaction effect exhibit the expected signs, both are statistically 
insignificant.  In particular, the main effect is positive and now slightly larger, 
suggesting that the effect of productivity growth on wage determination in the 
1970s was more consistent with neoclassical expectations.  Conversely, the 
interaction effect is negative, indicating a drop in the pay-off workers receive for 
rising productivity during the neoliberal era.  This is consistent with the 
sociological research mentioned above.  Note that, for the neoliberal era, 
productivity’s net effect on real wage growth equals the sum of the main effect and 
the interaction effect (i.e. 0.173 – 0.138 = 0.035).  Conversely, for the 1970s, 
productivity’s net effect on real wage growth equals the main effect alone (i.e. 
0.173). Notwithstanding the statistical insignificance of both terms, the net effect 
for the neoliberal era remains positive, albeit much smaller than the main effect 
alone.   Also note that the neoliberal period indicator is negative, large and highly 
significant, indicating the presence of some factor, which depresses real wage 
growth but is not captured by my existing independent variables.8  I return to this 
idea in the conclusion.   
Lastly, the empirical analysis ends with a final robustness tests.  Some 
readers may wonder whether my results reflect the unusual circumstances found 
in the United States.  To assess this question, I omit the US observations from my 
sample and re-estimate Model 7.  Although not reported to conserve space, the 
results from the model excluding the US data are remarkably similar to those 
including the US data.  This outcome suggests that my findings are not reliant on 







 Drawing on theoretical perspectives from sociology and economics, this 
study documents and explains the unique patterns of real wage growth found in 
the manufacturing sectors of 14 advanced capitalist countries since 1970.  The 
analysis sheds light on the multifaceted social forces involved in wage setting—an 
important societal process, with deep implications for social stratification and 
income inequality, but one rarely studied by sociologists.  Prodding the literature 
on wage determination in a more sociological direction, I depart from the 
neoclassical view by maintaining that productivity growth is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for real wage growth (see Figures 1 and 2; Table 1).  It is 
necessary because productivity growth plays an essential role in expanding the 
amount of income available for distribution, but insufficient because it alone 
cannot guarantee that workers receive pay raises.  The latter outcome is influenced 
by a range of market and institutional forces that affect the balance of class power 
in labor markets.  In particular, my empirical analysis shows that the real wage 
increases when unemployment falls and when trade unions and left-labor parties 
gain strength.  I also find that, holding other factors constant, corporatist 
bargaining systems moderate wage growth, ostensibly by encouraging trade 
unions to consider the long-term implications of their wage demands.  Notably, 
sociological theories of class conflict anticipate many of these findings, but until 
now have not been used to create an overarching account of wage determination.    
 While my empirical results support sociological theories of class conflict, 
they provide less support for the neoclassical view of wage determination.  
According to the neoclassical perspective, competitive market forces cause real 
wages to track labor productivity.  Such a view of wage determination paints a rosy 
view of capitalism, because it suggests that workers and employers equitably share 
the benefits of rising productivity.  My first set of models (i.e. the FE models) found 
 
 
support for this idea, but my more rigorous models (i.e. those using dynamic 
specifications or FD regression techniques) cast serious doubt on the neoclassical 
view.  Regarding the latter findings, it is conceivable that the neoclassical view is 
correct and that my results are erroneous in some way, perhaps reflecting 
measurement error.  It is worth noting that productivity is an inherently difficult 
concept to measure (Block and Burns, 1986) and that adjusting nominal wages for 
historical price changes is not always straightforward.   In fact, a close reading of 
neoclassical theory suggests that nominal wage trends should be deflated not with 
the consumer price index, as I do here and others do elsewhere, but with the 
producer price index, which more narrowly measures the prices domestic 
producers receive for their output.  It is possible that the two inflation measures 
diverge in ways that obscure productivity’s effect on real wage growth (Messina et 
al., 2009).  Future sociological research should examine this possibility.   
 However, I contend that the neoclassical view is essentially correct, but no 
longer holds because contemporary labor markets are insufficiently competitive 
(i.e. too monopsonistic) or because they function differently due to technological, 
organizational, and regulatory changes.  These latter ideas, I believe, account for 
the inconsistency between my results and the neoclassical view.  Clearly, to rule 
out model misspecification, it would be helpful to assess wage determination with 
direct measures of market power and technological change, so these alternative 
explanations could be tested directly.  Yet to my knowledge panel data on such 
variables do not exist.9    
 Regarding my model specification, I note that the neoliberal period 
indicator in Model 8 reveals a significant amount of change in real wage growth 
that cannot be attributed to other independent variables in my model.  What 
accounts for this unexplained portion of real wage growth? To address this 
question, future research my wish to examine whether the so-called “shareholder 
 
 
revolution,” brought about by the financialization of the economy, changed 
corporate business practices in ways that redirected earned income away from 
workers’ wages and toward shareholders’ dividends (see Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2000).  Perhaps this phenomenon could be measured with a variable capturing 
financialization.  Similarly, the policy changes associated with the neoliberalism are 
broad ranging, clearly relevant to real wage growth, but difficult to measure 
directly.  Perhaps future research can make headway by introducing more direct 
measures of the relevant policy changes brought about by neoliberalism.  
 My study has important theoretical implications.  My sociologically 
informed conceptualization of wage determination suggests that firms and 
workers have more agency than typically acknowledged by economic perspectives 
on labor markets, and that this agency can be used to alter market conditions in 
strategic ways.  In particular, a sociological approach to studying labor markets 
could start from the premise that both markets and institutions affect 
distributional outcomes, and then proceed to examine how particular social actors 
use available power resources to shape markets and institutions to their 
advantage.  For firms, this means gaining monopsonistic positions in labor markets, 
substituting high-wage domestic workers for machinery or low-wage foreign 
workers, and taking advantage of high unemployment to negotiate favorable wage 
contracts.   For workers, this means using collective action to build organizational 
power in labor markets and political power in government.  In this regard, my 
study corroborates the potential usefulness of Sørensen’s (2000) attempt to 
incorporate rent-seeking (e.g. via monopsony) into sociological accounts of class 
and class conflict.   
My study also sheds light on an underappreciated determinant of social 
stratification and income inequality in advanced capitalist societies.  Here the 
important point is that, if productivity increases but real wages stagnate, levels of 
 
 
income inequality necessarily rise.  This occurs because these conditions allow 
firms and their elite workers to monopolize the rewards of economic progress 
instead of sharing them more broadly as neoclassical theory suggests.  If wages lag 
behind productivity over a significant period of time, patterns of social 
stratification can change significantly.  This seems to be happening in the United 
States.  For this reason, Sakamoto and Kim (2014) urge sociologists and related 
social scientists to pay greater attention to the interplay between productivity and 
wages as a determinant of income inequality and social stratification.  My study 
provides further support for their call for more sociological research on this topic.   
 Finally, my empirical findings suggest that workers in most advanced 
capitalist countries wield enough bargaining power to offset at least some of the 
growing bargaining power of firms.   When workers succeed in this regard, real 
wages can move upward even when their employers gain market advantages due 
to policy, technological, and organizational changes.   Yet the situation in the United 
States is starkly different.  Here falling trade union membership and the absence of 
a genuine left-labor party leave American manufacturing workers uniquely 
exposed to the growing bargaining power of their employers.  Consequently, the 
real wages of American manufacturing workers continue to stagnate even though 
their labor productivity moves forward at a sound rate.  In sum, my study suggests 
that real wages are most likely to track productivity when workers are sufficiently 
organized to demand and receive a fair price for their labor.  Otherwise, the 
rewards of rising productivity are appropriated by capital and elite workers.  
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Table 1. Average per Annum Growth Rates in Real Wages and Productivity by 
Decade,  
14 Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1970 to 2007 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total 
Real Wage Growth 2.03 0.55 0.94 0.99 1.12 
Productivity Growth 1.24 1.43 1.89 3.15 1.90 
      
Wage-Productivity 
Ratio  
1.64 0.38 0.49 0.31 0.59 
Note: Wage-productivity ratio equals growth in the real wage divided by growth in 
productivity.  The 2000s only include years 2000 to 2007. 
 
 
Table 2. Fixed Effects, FGLS Regression Estimates of Real Wage Growth in the 
Manufacturing Sectors of 14 Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1970 to 2007. 
 Real Wage  
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Market Conditions     


















     
Workers’ Power Resources  


















   Corporatism squared 
 












     
Real wage t-1     
     
 











Number of observations  520 520 520 506 
Country dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific trend dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors.   





Table 3. First Difference, FGLS Regression Estimates of Real Wage Growth in the 
Manufacturing Sectors of 14 Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1970 to 2007. 
 Real Wage Δ 
 (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
Market Conditions     




















     
Workers’ Power Resources     
































Interaction Effect     
   Year ≥1980    -4.358*** 
(.236) 
   Year ≥1980 * Productivity growth Δ    -.138 
(.121) 
     









Number of observations  506 506 506 506 
Country dummies? No No No No 
Year dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific trend dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors.   










Figure 1. Trends in the Real Wage and Productivity in the Manufacturing Sectors  
of 14 Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1970 to 2007 
  
NOTE:  The real wage is the inflation-adjusted hourly wage, which includes overtime pay, 
incentive pay, and employer contributions to private or government-mandated social 
insurance schemes.  Productivity equals output per manufacturing worker (measured in 
volumes).  Left axis measures the growth index of the real wage, and the right axis measures 
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Figure 2.  Average per Annum Growth in Real Wages and Productivity in the 
Manufacturing Sector:  14 Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1970 to 2007 
 
 
Note: Countries arrayed from highest to lowest based on average productivity growth between 1970 and 2007. 
 
  



















1 My study differs from Western and Healy (1999) in several notable ways:  (i) I 
emphasize the assumed importance of labor productivity, while they use it merely 
as a control variable. (ii) My measure of labor productivity (output per worker in 
the manufacturing sector) is much better than their measure (GDP per worker in 
the total economy).  (iii)They focus on whether the oil crisis of the 1970s initiated 
a temporal break in the longstanding determinants of wage growth, or whether the 
observed slowdown arose from the normal business cycle.  This contrasts 
significantly with my theoretical framework. (iv)My models include more 
independent variables (i.e. trade globalization) and assess data over a more current 
period.   
  
2  Data on labor productivity are missing from Austria (1970–1975) and the 
Netherlands (1970–1976). 
 
3 This creates a mismatch in the level of measurement. Real wage growth and labor 
productivity are measured at the sector level, but the other independent variables 
at the economy-wide level.  This cannot be helped due to the lack of panel data on 
wages for the total economy.   
 
4 Results from a Hausman test on Model 3, assessing a null hypothesis that the 
random effects are uncorrelated with the model’s existing regressors, could not be 
rejected (Prob>chi2 = 0.0309.).  This suggests that RE estimation should not be 
used.    
 
5 Using an OLS-FE estimator, three post-estimation tests are conducted on Model 3 
from Table 2. (1) A Wooldridge test, performed with the xtserial command, 
assesses a null hypothesis that the errors in the specified model do not exhibit first-
order serial correlation.  The results (prob > F = 0.000) strongly suggest the 
presence of serial correlation. (2) A modified version of the Breusch-Pagan test, 
performed with the xttest2 command, assesses a null hypothesis that the errors in 
the specified model are independent across countries. The results (prob > χ2 = 
0.000) suggest the presence of contemporaneously correlated errors across 
countries.  (3) A modified version of the Wald test, performed with the xttest3 
command, assesses a null hypothesis that the errors in the specified model have a 
common variance across panels.  This null hypothesis is also rejected (prob > χ2 =   
0.000). 
 
6  Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root tests, using the xtunitroot command, indicate that 
three variables (real wage, productivity and imports from LDCs) are non-
stationary even after including a time trend.  
 
7 The highest IVFs is 2.37 and the average is 1.79.  This does not consider the 
correlation between independent variables and their squared terms (i.e. union 






8 I also test for temporal breaks among the other independent variables in my 
model.   Although not reported here, none of these interaction effects are 
statistically significant, although most exhibit the expected signs.  For instance, the 
effects of left-labor parties on real wage growth lessen in the neoliberal era, but not 
in a statistically significant way. These findings are marginally consistent with the 
evidence presented by Western and Healy (1999). 
 
9  I know of no measures of market power.  However, the EU KLEMS project 
(http://www.euklems.net/) offers high-quality panel data on annual investment in 
telecommunication and computer technologies (a proxy for technological change), 
but data only go back to 1995 for most countries.  In the future, as new observations 
are added, this should become a good source for panel data on technological 
change.  
 
 
